Hopkins remarks that, in general, all of Nga-wang-bel-den's notes address a specific qualm. The problem here in note ka is that Jam-yang-shay-ba does not say that only the existence of emptiness is posited by a worldly innate awareness. Instead, he says that ``All these phenomena must be posited for the worldly innate awareness." Since ``all these phenomena '' refers to ''the varieties and their mode,'' all phenomena seem to be included in this statement by Jam-yang-shay-ba such that everything--even emptiness--is posited by a worldly innate awareness. But in Jam-yang-shay-ba's own Ge-luk system, emptiness is not posited by a worldly innate awareness.

This is because according to Jam-yang-shay-ba's own definition, such a worldly innate awareness:

does not analyze [to try to find] the object designated and does not superimpose [falsity] through the conception [of phenomena] as truly existent.

Realization of emptiness is merely the non-finding of the object of negation. You do not enter into any thought, ``This is emptiness.'' A consciousness that thinks such would be a valid cognition of conventional phenomena, for it is dealing with the existence of something, in this case emptiness.(Emptiness Yoga, 201-202).

Thus, Jam-yang-shay-ba's statement seems too broad. He is on firm doctrinal ground when he says the ji snyed ba are posited by a worldly innate awareness. It is only emptiness (the ji lta ba) which cannot be cognized by a worldly innate awareness (and therefore receives Nga-wang-bel-den's qualifier, making the phrase read: ``the existence of emptiness").

The reason that emptiness is not posited in the face of a worldly innate awareness is that emptiness is only posited in the face of the wisdom of meditative equipoise (mnyam gzhag ye shes). A worldly innate awareness is not a wisdom of meditative equipoise because a wisdom of meditative equipoise is an awareness that exists through the power of analysis to find the object designated.

A wisdom of meditative equipoise of the path of seeing has two parts: an uninterrupted path that abandons the artificial afflictions, and a path of release that is the state of having abandoned these with respect to the four noble truths. The state of having abandoned the artificial conceptions of inherent existence with respect to the wisdom consciousness itself is called subsequent, even though it occurs simultaneously with the wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Thus, Nga-wang-bel-den qualifies Jam-yang-shay-ba by stating that it is not emptiness itself which is posited by the worldly mind, but the existence of emptiness: in other words, the existence of emptiness is posited in the face of that mind. Regarding this, Newland states:

Since the existence of emptiness is not an emptiness, it cannot be an object realized by ultimate valid cognition. Hence, the existence of emptiness, like the existence of all other phenomena, is a concealer truth and must be established by conventional valid cognition. (See Guy Newland, The Two Truths, 83.)

1. it must be well-known to the world, \ie\ to conventional consciousnesses,
2. it must not be invalidated by conventional valid cognition, and
3. it must not be invalidated by a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate. (See Newland, 84.)

Hopkins says this first criterion means that a conventional object's sound generality (sgra spyi) appears to a conventional awareness. Even the sound generality of emptiness can appear to a conventional awareness, since even emptiness is posited as conventionally existent. However, since the sound generality of the horns of a rabbit also is renowned to a conventional awareness, one wonders what is excluded by this first criterion. Probably nothing, if emptiness and the horns of a rabbit are included.

The second problem in note ka occurs even if one adds the qualifier, as Nga-wang-bel-den does, that it is the existence of emptiness that is posited by a worldly innate awareness. The problem is that Jam-yang-shay-ba also states that such a worldly innate awareness ``does not analyze to try to find the object designated". Can an awareness that does not analyze to try to find the object designated be aware of even the existence} of emptiness?

Hopkins suggests that an awareness of the existence of emptiness would necessarily be a wisdom of subsequent realization ( rjes thobs ye shes). This is a type of mind that realizes through the power of knowledge arising from the wisdom of meditative equipoise. In the case of a wisdom of subsequent realization, that knowledge would be of emptiness. One realizes emptiness, and after the realization, due to the force of having known emptiness, one now knows that it exists.

Does a wisdom of subsequent realization analyze to try to find the object designated? If it does, it must be a reasoning consciousness, and thus not suitable to be a worldly innate awareness. It is not suitable because Jam-yang-shay-ba explicitly states that such awarenesses do not analayze or superimpose. Therefore, in the phrase ``worldly innate awareness," the word ``innate" rules out an awareness that analyzes to find the object of negation (and perhaps ``worldly" rules out an awareness of non-existent phenomena, such as inherent existence).

In conclusion, Nga-wang-bel-den does two things with this brief note: he corrects what is probably an oversight in Jam-yang-shay-ba's discussion of the object of negation, and he opens the door to a stimulating doctrinal disputation on the settling of emptiness.}

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